Monetary Law Blog

Conference on Experience with and Preparations for the Euro

After joining the EU in 2004 the ten ‘new’ Member States’s goal is adopting the euro and joining the euro area. On 1 January 2007 Slovenia is going to be the first to succeed in this goal.

In May 2006 the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB, National Bank of Austria) and the Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Austrian Federal Economic Chamber) brought together experts from the euro area, who had gained experience with introducing the euro, with the experts from the new EU Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro for an exchange of views.

During a three day conference more than 280 leading experts from governments, central banks, the business community and academia seized this opportunity for fruitful exchanges, discussions and networking. 

The proceedings of this conference may be found on OeNB’s website.

After joining the EU in 2004 the ten ‘new’ Member States’s goal is adopting the euro and joining the euro area. On 1 January 2007 Slovenia is going to be the first to succeed in this goal.

In May 2006 the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB, National Bank of Austria) and the Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Austrian Federal Economic Chamber) brought together experts from the euro area, who had gained experience with introducing the euro, with the experts from the new EU Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro for an exchange of views.

During a three day conference more than 280 leading experts from governments, central banks, the business community and academia seized this opportunity for fruitful exchanges, discussions and networking. 

The proceedings of this conference may be found on OeNB’s website.

National central banks and Community public sector procurement legislation: a critical overview

ECB Legal Working Paper series / No. 3 / October 2006 / by Jorge García-Andrade and Phoebus Athanassiou

Abstract

On 31 March 2004 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted the Public Sector Procurement Directive, with a national implementation deadline of 31 January 2006. In common with earlier Community public sector procurement legislation, the new Directive seeks to ensure that European public sector entities award contracts in an efficient, transparent and non-discriminatory manner, thereby contributing to the elimination of public procurement as a non-tariff barrier to the development of a genuine Single Market for goods and services throughout the EU.
Although some of the Member State national central banks (NCBs) are listed in an Annex to the Public Sector Procurement Directive as ‘contracting authorities’, it is not clear to what extent all Member State NCBs are subject to its provisions. A review of national legislation implementing EU public sector procurement rules reveals significant variations with regard to its coverage of Member State NCBs. The lack of ECJ case-law directly on this question leaves some more room for speculation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Member State NCBs are subject to the Public Sector Procurement Directive and to Community public sector procurement legislation at large. For the purposes of their inquiry, the authors will rely on the case-law of the ECJ interpreting Community public procurement rules, on considerations derived from the nature, mission and tasks of Member State NCBs and on the impact of their participation in the ESCB as possible sources of guidance concerning the existence of an obligation for Member State NCBs to comply with the rules and principles enshrined in Community public sector procurement legislation.
The paper concludes that there is little reason to suggest that Member State NCBs should not be subject to the principles underlying the Community procurement regime or even to the Community procurement rules themselves.

See my contribution on the ECB Legal Working Paper series.

Download LWP No. 3 (pdf, 870 kb)

The ECB's advisory role

Pursuant to Article 105(4) EC Treaty the ECB has to be consulted on any draft national legislative provision or proposed Community act in its field of competence. Katja Würtz, legal counsel for the ECB, has written a paper on ‘The Legal Framework Applicable to ECB Consultations on Proposed Community Acts’ (Euredia 2005/4, 283-327).

 

In her paper Würtz also discussess the scope of the ECB’s ‘fields of competence’ within the meaning of Article 105(4). This is done on the basis of the European Court of Justice’s judgement in the OLAF case (C-11/00). Furthermore, the paper assesses the legal consequences of non-consultation of the ECB on proposed Community acts in the ECB’s fields of competence.

 

On the ECB’s advisory role see also Atilla Arda, ‘Consulting the European Central Bank. Legal Aspects of the Community and National Authorities' Obligation to Consult the ECB Pursuant to Article 105(4) EC’, European Banking and Financial Law Journal (Euredia) 2004/1, 111-152.

The ECB’s Constitutional Autonomy and Independence in the OLAF Judgment

The European Central Bank “falls squarely within the Community framework” and its independence is of a functional nature, according to the European Court of Justice in its OLAF judgement (C-11/00).

 

Roger J. Goebel, in Fordham International Law Journal (29: 610-654, 2006), devotes an Article on this judgement: ‘Court of Justice Oversight over the European Central Bank: Delimiting the ECB’s Constitutional Autonomy and Independence in the OLAF Judgment’.

 

This Article first discusses the high importance of the principle of independence for the ECB in its control of monetary policy and the euro. The Article then reviews the EC Treaty’s attribution to the ECJ of jurisdiction within Monetary Union. The following section sets out the conflict between the Commission and the ECB in the OLAF case.

 

The final section provides several reflections upon the ultimate impact of the judgement and the Advocate-General’s opinion. The reflections stress the importance of the ECJ’s rejection of the ECB’s claim to virtual autonomy in constitutional terms and the related subjection of the ECB to the rule of law within the European Community.

papers on the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact

One year after the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact of the EU, concerning the EU’s budgetary rules, European Law Review and Common Market Law Review have published papers assessing the merits of the said revision. Furthermore, Springer-Verlag has published a book on this issue.

 

In CMLR (43: 85-106, 2006) Jean-Victor Louis concludes that “the main weaknesses of the system are not due to the Pact or its reform. They concern the loose concept of coordination and the weight given to ‘peer pressure’ in the [EC] Treaty itself, for the sake of preserving national ‘sovereignty’ (…) Flexibility [introduced by the revision of the Pact] will not necessarily lead to arbitrariness – but in order to avoid it, one will need a lot of sense of responsibility in the action of all the authorities involved.”

 

Fabian Amtenbrink and Jakob de Haan, in ELRev (31: 402-413, 2006), reach a similar conclusion: “the recent amendment [of the Pact] does not qualify as a major overhaul of the system of economic co-ordination in EMU. Indeed, the reform, which is limited to an amendment of secondary Community law, cannot remedy the basic birth defects of Arts 99 and 104 EC [Treaty] that are their poor enforcement mechanisms.”

 

In this context I would also like to mention a recent publication by Springer-Verlag, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Experience and Future Aspects’ (Fritz Breuss, ed.). This publication contains the revised papers presented at a conference of the same name on March 10-11, 2005.

 

Part 1 deals with the “Legal Aspects of the SGP”. Unfortunately, only Jean-Victor Louis’ paper on “The Legal Foundations of the SGP in Primary and Secondary EC Law” is published. Three other speakers who addressed the European Court of Justices’ first judgement (27/04) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure were – according to the publisher – not able to supply a written version of their presentations.